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INTRODUCTION

within groups. We incorporate these theories and
marketing theories to develop a model to explain water
conservation. We empirically test the framework using a
survey done in Israel. Major findings are that, on
average, the stated willingness to conserve was about
15 percent and that the fairness theorem holds; i.e.,
individuals’ willingness to voluntarily conserve water
decreases with economic incentives taken by the
government.

A growing demand for water in the industrial and
residential sectors and increased concerns for
environmental quality combined with limited water
supply augmentation have raised water scarcity issues
and led policymakers to consider policies that enhance
water use efficiency. Most water reforms aim to reduce
the demand of the agricultural sector, which is the
largest user. These efforts include water pricing (see
Tsur & Dinar, 1997; Boggess, Lacewell, & Zilberman,
1993); water markets (see Kaiser & McFarl, 1997, for a
survey); and trade mechanisms (Brill, Hochman, &
Zilberman, 1997). Strong political lobbying and the need
to maintain independent domestic food production have
led policymakers to direct conservational efforts in the
urban residential sector. The capacity to conserve water
by raising residential water prices is limited as urban
water prices are already high and the elasticity of
demand is low. Thus, there is a need to increase
voluntary water conservation through education.
Educational efforts may include a campaign to
encourage installation of water conservation devices
and more responsible use of water in gardening,
washing, and other activities.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Water is one of the market goods used to produce
household commodities and it is also consumed as a
final commodity. Consumers need a minimum quantity
of water. It is common to model the demand for water
using the Stone-Geary utility function in either the
Cobb-Douglas, linear, or log-log forms (see, for example,
Hanemann, 1997; Becker, Zeitouni, & Zilberman, 2000).
This form of demand ignores education and
conservation activities. A key factor in modeling water
conservation activities is that the consumer needs to
care about the community; i.e., he or she gains from the
benefits of the community.
The issue of low
participation in public projects (Dawes & Thaler, 1988) is
a focal element in education strategy.

Reported residential water savings attributed to past
conservation campaigns fall in the range of one to five
percent. Michelsen, McGuckin, and Stumpf (1999)
report a one to four percent saving in 12 cities in the
United States, and the Israeli Water Authority reported a
one to five percent saving in 1997 to 2000. Although
these numbers are substantial, little is known about the
extent that education can further reduce water usage,
which affects public campaigns aimed at “de-marketing”
or “un-selling” a product.

The act of giving up your own benefit to help others is
usually referred as to altruism or pro-social behavior
(Schwartz, 1997; Baston & Shaw, 1991; Price, Feick, &
Guskey, 1995). (The translation of social responsibility
to economic behavior is done by adding the attitude
toward the policy or the community to the utility
function (Train, McFadden, & Goett, 1987; Rabin, 1993)).
Rabin argued that his fairness model applies to altruism
and labor efforts.

This paper aims to analyze the motivation for choosing
advertising as a tool to reduce household consumption
of water and to empirically document its effect based on
a survey conducted in Israel.

Labor economists analyzed situations where the
individual’s efforts contribute to the collective but incur
personal cost. The motivation to cooperate comes from
adding a share of the collective earnings to the personal
income. A worker needs to allocate his efforts between
his own business (farm) and working for the collective.
The collective member’s evaluation of others’ efforts

To understand voluntary conservation, we use theories
that address issues of fairness and labor effort allocation
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affects his own contribution to the collective efforts
(Bonin, 1977; Parliament, Tsur, & Zilberman, 1989).
There is some tradeoff between water and time in the
production of commodities. For example, a car can be
washed using an irrigation pipe, which wastes much
water but is done easily and quickly; or water can be
supplied in buckets, which conserves water but is costly
in terms of time.

Social norms are updated by education (advertisement),
A, and comparing one’s actions to the actions of others.
The latter may operate the social justice adjustment
mechanism; i.e., one’s feeling that the burden is
allocated fairly and that others contribute their share.
This is often a moderate factor in multi-player
cooperative decisions and outcome (see Akelof, 1982;
Thaler, 1985; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; &
Rabin, 1993). Advertising is used in this case to
educate; i.e., change social norms. This suggests that
initial perception of social norms is updated by
educational advertisement activities and observing the
behavior of others:

Schwartz (1977) and Osterhus (1997) argue that
consumer choice is moderated by social norms and the
individual’s need to meet those norms. Schwartz’s
(1977) altruism model addresses both social and
personal norms, where the personal (subjective) norms
affect the influence of the social norms on the
individual’s behavior. Osterhus (1997) models strategies
that are used to induce contribution to the others, and
he uses the term pro-social activity. He distinguishes
between economic incentives (prices and rewards),
normative influence (social and individual norm and their
interaction), and structural factors (mediators of the
interaction between social and personal norms, such as
visibility). Osterhus (1997) found that the effect of social
norms on consumption is mediated by factors such as
responsibility and trust. A low feeling of responsibility
and low trust in the actions of the advertiser may cause
a weak linkage between social normative behavior and
individual consumption. Visibility of personal actions is
a key structural factor mediating the translation of social
norms to personal behavior. Environmentalism and inhouse water-conservation behavior are by definition
almost invisible; thus, social norms should be
operationalized by generating a high sense of personal
responsibility and involvement, and by demonstrating
the consequences of non-social behavior.

S = S0 + g( A) + k1 j ∑ S j ; .

Personal responsibility decreases if an individual feels
that his/her actions will not affect the outcome. Thus, if
one thinks that the government will do the job, he/she
will probably be more passive. The fairness model
suggests that if the government will reduce public water
consumption then consumers may feel that it is only fair
to contribute their share;

∂k2
> 0 (G is government action).
∂G

If water prices increase, then consumers may think that
they are already doing their share.
Incorporating the concept of fairness or benefit from
others utility, family production function framework into
the individual’s utility, yields the consumer’s
maximization problem:

MaxSW U(Qi , t0 , S)

The above discussion suggests that water conservation
norm is a translation of social and personal norms. It is a
function of the gap between the two and the price of
behaving differently from others, and it increases with
levels of observability and responsibility. Suppose that
there are j individuals in a certain society. Let S
represent the personal water conservation norm,
S =
S is the society’s norm, ρ is the marginal
j j
price of deviation from social norms, and level of
observability and responsibility are k 1 and k 2 ,
respectively. Personal social norm before advertisement
is:

(3)

subject to:

Qi = f (Yi , ti ,Wi )
Pw W + Py Y ≤ I + zt w
t0 + t w + ts ≤ T

∑

S0 = f (k1,k2 , ρ, S )

(2)

where S W is the intensity of water conservation,
0 ≤ SW < 1, S is social norms, W is defined as the
quantity of water consumed, Y is other market goods, t0
is leisure time; z is the hourly wage, t0 is leisure, tw is
time spent on work, and ts is the leisure time spent to
save water. I is the initial endowment, Pw is the price of
one unit of water, Py is the price of other market goods,
and T is the effective time constraint.

(1)
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Solution of the consumer’s maximization problem yields
that the optimal saving is:

BACKGROUND: ISRAEL’S WATER CRISES
In 1999, after a very arid winter, the Israeli Water
Authority decreased the quantity of water allocated for
agricultural usage by 250 million m3 (a reduction of 40
percent from 1998). The Ministry of Agriculture (1999)
allocated the quantity that needed to be saved among
the different crops using a lexicographic decision rule;
i.e., first minimizing long-term damage to the produce
and then allocating based on the marginal value of
production. For example, water allocation for cotton and
wheat irrigation was reduced by 100 percent; for
vegetables, including potatoes, by 30 percent; and for
fruits, including citrus, by 20 percent. The Ministry of
Agriculture demanded that farmers be compensated for
the reduction in water usage by 1 NIS (about $0.25) per
m3. The political instability that characterized the Israeli
Parliament and a lack of agreement between the Treasury
and the Agricultural Ministry led to delays in
announcing the new water quotas. These went into
effect in May 1999 and by then it was too late for many
farmers to follow the official guidelines. Thus, the actual
agricultural sector reduced the amount of water used by
only 29 percent.

 ∂t ∂W ∂SW 
PW  ∂S W 
Ut 0 1− 0
1−
+ US
 = UY
PY 
∂S 
 ∂W ∂S W ∂S 
The left-hand side is the marginal loss from reduction of
leisure time as water consumption increases and the
right-hand side is the increase in marginal utility from
consumption of other products (as consumers save
water) plus the increase in social benefit.
The desired reduction in household water consumption
can be achieved by increasing the price of the water, Pw
or increasing both social norms and responsibility. The
relative effectiveness of price and manipulation of
personal norms is determined by the ratio between ρ
and δ . Key factors in voluntary conservation are those
variables that affect the formation of personal norms and
its translation to conservation.
Our model assumes that personal responsibility will
decrease if it appears that somebody else (government)
will do the job, or if price increases and administrative
measures have already been imposed on the individual
or consumers think they should be imposed. As already
mentioned, social justice (i.e., ones feeling that the
burden has been fairly allocated) is often a moderating
factor in multi-player cooperative decisions and
outcome. Thus, it is expected that consumers who
support water price increases to other sectors will be
more willing to voluntarily save water.

The Ministry of Agriculture conditioned its future
agreement for further reductions in water supply by
applying similar water-saving steps to both the
industrial
and
private
sectors
(household
consumption)1. One of the demands imposed by the
Ministry was to increase the price of water supplied to
municipal authorities, the suppliers of water to the urban
sector. Increasing the price to households may have a
“positive” moral effect on feelings of social justice, but
its effect on reducing demand is very low as households
price elasticity is stiff. The period between 2000 and the
beginning of 2001 did not improve the water balance
situation in Israel. In January 2001, only 30 million m3 of
water had been added to Lake Kinneret (the only water
reservoir in Israel) instead of the 80 average million m3.
It is anticipated that by the end of 2001, the water level
in Lake Kinneret will continue to decline to –214.32,
below the red line level set at –213 m (the red line
designates the lowest level of water the reservoir can
hold; thus, water should instead be pumped from other,
as yet unavailable, resources).

H1: The consumer’s willingness to save water (via
active measures) increases with his/her feelings that
other sectors will also engage in water-conserving
activities.
The translation of social norm to personal responsibility
is mediated by personal characteristics. Women have
been found to care more about the environment than
men (Ottman, 1993). Since water conservation has many
similar aspects with environmentalism, women are
expected to show higher willingness to save water. Age
was found to have a positive impact on conservation
(Neiswiadany, 1992).

WATER RESOURCES IN ISRAEL: TRENDS AND
POLICIES

H2: Women’s willingness to conserve water will be
higher than men’s.
H3: Willingness to save increases with age.

The demand for water in Israel has increased due to the
sharp rise in population caused by immigration3 and a
natural growth; that is why the supply has never caught
up. Water supply in Israel depends solely on rain.

81

Sequential dry years and over-pumping further
accelerated the existing water crisis. If and when a peace
agreement is signed among Israel, Lebanon, and the
Palestinians, water scarcity is expected to dramatically
increase.4 In 1998, the demand for water was higher than
its supply by 212 million m3, in 1999 the excess demand
had increased to 317 million m3; and in 2000 ground
water was overexploited by 350 million m3.

decreased by 23 percent, and the households’ response
to the advertisements was 5 percent. The public
response to the 2000 campaign was an estimated 10
percent saving (Mkorot Spokesperson).
In 2001, the Water Authority, the Treasury, and the
Agricultural Ministry agreed that the quantity allocated
to agricultural usage from the available drinking-quality
water would be reduced by 50 percent (available
quantity of 450-490 million m3, down from the long-term
average of 980-1000 million m3). A paper presented in
September 2000 by the R&D authority forecasted that in
a steady state the water supply would stand at around
530 million m3. The direct annual damage to the
economy from cutting back the water supply to
agricultural usage is anticipated to be about 2.0 billion
NIS ($0.5 billion US). In 2000, there were 0.2 million
irrigated hectares; after implementation of the new
policy, the Israeli agricultural sector will lose 0.05 million
hectares,5 9,000 hectares of orchards will be uprooted,
and 15,800 employees will be out of work.6

REGULATIONS, PRICES, AND ADVERTISEMENT

Water quantities and usage are determined by
administrative allocations and processes, both
monitored by the water director with the authority of the
1959 water law. Each year the Water Authority
determines water allocation to the different sectors
(agricultural, industrial, and municipal) for the coming
year. Water suppliers are constrained to these
allocations in their extraction permits (Kislev & Rosental,
1999).

In addition to these administrative steps, the Water
Authority decided to launch an advertising campaign
aimed at educating and encouraging water conservation
in December 2000. The slogan of the campaign was:
“Don’t let the winter ‘fool’ you; there is a still a water
shortage—please conserve.”
The television ads
showed everyday scenes where a parent wasted water
(not turning off the faucet while shaving, watering the
garden in the middle of the day, or answering the phone
while running the water in the kitchen), and a child
preaching to his parents about wasting water and
reminding them to turn off the faucet when not in use.
These types of ads showed individuals different ways to
save water and stressed their personal responsibility to
help ease the water shortage. The previous year’s
campaign, which was less effective, used a “sad baby”
concept showing various scenes of an arid, dried-up
environment.

The price of water for the farmer does not depend on
his/her location, although production prices depend on
distance from the water source. However, it does vary
as a function of usage. Farmers pay about $0.18 per m3
for the first 50 percent of their water allocation, $0.22 for
the next 30 percent, and $0.29 for the last 20 percent.
Industries pay about $0.22-$0.25, and individuals pay on
average $1.00 per cubic foot. The price of water for
agriculture has not changed much since the year of
Israel’s independence (1948) until the mid-1970s. In 1973
the price of water to agriculture was raised by about 5
percent, and in 1976 prices were raised by an additional
26 percent, a price level that stayed fixed until 1980. At
that point, prices rose again by about 20 percent, and
then decreased to their former level until 1986 when the
water allocation for agricultural usage was reduced by 10
percent. In 1990 prices rose to high levels, and in 1991
the price of water for agricultural usage increased again
by about 24 percent.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The Survey

The price of water allocated to agriculture increased in
1986, and the reduction in quantity decreased the
agricultural sector demand by 28 percent (16.4 percent in
addition to the administrative steps). Concomitant to the
pricing and administrative measures, the Water
Authority launched an advertising campaign aimed at
encouraging water conservation. The public response to
the 1986 campaign was minor, and household
consumption went down only 6 percent (Kislev &
Vacsin, 1997). In 1991, the agricultural sector’s demand

In January 2001 we surveyed 197 Israelis. Respondents
consisted of 140 undergraduate economic students from
two universities (Haifa University and the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem) and 57 employees of the
Hebrew University. This was a nonrepresentative
survey; however, since it was aimed at measuring the
effect of the advertising campaign and using gender and
the tradeoff between active and passive measures to
explain the magnitude of the conservation, sample
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choice is not expected to harm the validity of the
results.7 Respondents were asked whether or not they
remembered the latest water conservation campaign.
They were asked whether or not the ads encouraged
them to save water and then to estimate how much they
actually saved (in percent). The final question was:
What policy was the most effective in inducing water
conservation (increase price for household, increase
price for agriculture, stop watering public gardens, use
social advertising, or increase supply)?

Most of the respondents (60 percent) thought that
conservation should be undertaken by others; i.e.,
increase the price of water used in agriculture, stop
watering public gardens, or use advertising. However,
the fact that 40 percent agreed to an increase in the price
of water for household usage supports the
government’s policy.

Survey Results

Sw = a + b1Age + b2Gender+ b3Income+ b4 fairenessindex

Most of the 197 respondents (93.91 percent) remembered
the water conservation campaign. In general, most of
the Israelis (72.59 percent) complied with the challenge
of saving more water, whereas only 25 percent (3) of
those who did not see the campaign thought they would
save water; 75.6 percent (143 responders) were willing to
save water after being exposed to the campaign. Thus, in
this instance, the pro-social advertising campaign
achieved its purpose. The average saving was 15
percent. The declared figures are to be treated with
caution, as there is always a gap between declared
willingness to pay (act) and the actual one (see Berk et
al., 1993).

Where S w is the declared intensity of savings. Fairness
is measured by an individual’s acceptance of a certain
policy measure:

We estimated the effect of personal variables and
fairness measures using the following estimation:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Increase household price
Increase agricultural price
Stop watering public gardens
Advertise
Augment water supply.

Since the government is asking the public to save water,
then it is expected that willingness to save increases
with policies number 3 and 5 and decreases relative to
the other policies. The results of the empirical model are
given in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Estimating Main and Cross Effects of Age, Gender, Income, and Preferred Policy on the Intensity of
Conservation.
Parameter

B

Std. Error

t

Sig.

Intercept

73.6477064

14.85507

4.95775

2.07E-06

Intercept

-0.281396

0.175342

-1.60484

0.110831

AGE

-64.92443

21.31845

-3.04546

0.002787

Man

-51.79651

17.23077

-3.00605

0.003149

INCOME=Low

-57.196977

14.41215

-3.96866

0.000116

INCOME=Medium

54.8667493

25.58474

2.144511

0.033757

-54.743794

15.76996

-3.4714

0.000693

Increase price for agriculture

19.5671339

12.59201

1.553933

0.122508

Stop watering public gardens

-45.281396

17.22608

-2.62865

0.009551

Use advertis ement

-35.712339

14.84468

-2.40573

0.017475

Recommended Policy:
Increase household price

Increase Supply of water
R2 square = 0.248

0

83

These results suggest that:

particular, we found that the willingness to save
increases with governmental conservation efforts and
supply augmentation, and decreases with a price
increase.

1. Women responded better to the campaign than men;
i.e., their willingness to save water after the
campaign was significantly higher than the men’s.
Women increased the probability of saving by 58
percent.
2. Younger individuals responded better to the
conservation campaign.
Each additional year
showed a decrease of 0.3 percent in water
conservation.
3. Individuals with high incomes are willing to save
more than low- or medium-income individuals.
4. The theories of fairness and effort allocation within
groups, which argue that personal efforts are
affected by others’ action, were strongly supported.
The willingness to save sharply declines when
economic incentives are used. It increases when
the public sector does voluntary water-saving
activities such as no watering of public gardens.
5. There is a tradeoff between a price increase and
voluntary conservation.

Our study found that women were found to be more
responsive to the advertisement campaign, wealthier
individuals cared more about the environment than
others, and mature respondents showed a higher
willingness to save.
This may suggest that
advertisements should be targeted more towards women
by appealing to their sense of responsibility.
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End Notes:
1

“Water Usage in Agriculture and the Rural Sector,” a
special economic report on the situation of the
agricultural and the rural sectors. Prepared by the
Department of Research Development, the Ministry of
Agriculture, July 1999, Ch 2.2.6.
2
See Rinat (2001).
3
More than 1 million Russian Jewish immigrants during
the 80s (20 percent increase in the population in three
years) and a steady immigration rate of 60,000 (1 percent)
per year in the following years.
4
In his book “Rivers of Fire: The Conflict of Water in the
Middle East,” Arnon Sofer (1992) argues that the water
shortage in the Middle East will cause a war between
Arabs and Israelis.
5
One of the informal benefits of agriculture is that it
occupies and signal rights on land. Given that a final
agreement about the borders of and ownership rights
between Israel and the Palestinians hasn’t yet been
signed, stopping to farmland could have a serious
political impact.
6
The R&D department (September 20, 2000) report
submitted to the general manager of the Agricultural
Ministry.
7
We compared results from the student group with
those obtained from the university employees, a more
representative group, and found no significant
differences in any of our analyses.
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